We utilise a modified Cube Rule to forecast seat shares for the parties in the House of Commons in 2015 based on data from 1945 to 2010
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. It is derived from the so-called 'Law of Cubic Proportions' formalised by the statisticians Kendall and Stuart (1950) in an article which represents the starting point of contemporary election forecasting modelling in Britain.
The literature on election forecasting in Britain has grown tremendously in recent years and a variety of approaches have been used to predict electoral outcomes (Whiteley, 1979; Mughan, 1987; Norpoth, 2004; Sanders, 1991 Sanders, , 2005 Belanger, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2005 ; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Belanger, 2009; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2011; Murr, 2011; Fisher et al. 2011; Lebo and Norpoth, 2011) . These models utilise different methodological approaches and can be classified in a variety of different ways, but two important types recur in the literature. There are popularity functions, which utilise time series analyses of monthly or quarterly poll data to capture the relationship between voting intentions, the economy and other variables, for the purpose of forecasting. This approach was introduced by Goodhart and Bhansali, (1970) in a seminal paper on economic voting.
Secondly, there are vote function models which utilise data on election results, an approach pioneered by Kendall and Stuart (1950) . These models use aggregate data measured over time or alternatively at the constituency level to derive the forecasts (Johnston et al. 2006) .
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Popularity functions are based on relatively large numbers of observations, particularly in the contemporary era with the presence of many opinion polls, and this increases the precision of model estimates (Duch and Stevenson, 2008) . On the other hand this approach faces the problem of translating vote forecasts into seats, since winning a general election in Britain does not mean winning most
votes, but rather the most seats in the House of Commons. This is not a trivial distinction either since in the twentieth century the party winning most votes did not win most seats on three different occasions. This happened in 1929 , 1951 and again in the February 1974 there is a clear advantage in modelling the number of seats at the outset rather than analysing voting intentions which subsequently have to be translated into seats.
The Seats-Votes model uses aggregate analysis combining seat shares from all eighteen general elections since the Second World War with poll data to forecast seats in the Commons. It does not face the same problem as popularity function models, but the sample size is small making it essential to conduct extensive diagnostic testing to ensure that the models are well-behaved. It also requires the analysis to focus on political parties that have been in existence since 1945, and so has little to say about the rise of new parties such as the Scottish National Party or UKIP. These considerations aside, it is a relatively simple model with a respectable track record, although as the discussion below shows it has to be modified to deal with the era of Coalition politics.
The Seats-Votes Model
The seats-votes model adapts 'Law of Cubic Proportions' or the 'Cube Rule' to forecast seats shares over time. According to the Kendall and Stuart the Cube Rule:
'.. states that the proportion of seats won by the victorious party varies as the cube of the proportion of votes cast for that party over the country as a whole.' (Kendall and Stuart, 1950: 183) .
Using their example of the 'White' and 'Black' parties then:
where:
W is the 'White' party and B is the 'Black' party seat shares P 0 is the White party vote share and Q 0 is the Black party vote share, with P 0 = 1-Q 0 , so that:
When they applied this model to the task of forecasting seat shares in the 1950 general election in Britain using poll data collected three days before the election the results were extremely accurate. The forecasting errors were one seat for Labour, five seats for the Conservatives and four seats for other parties, with the Liberal forecast being spot on (Kendall and Stuart ,1950: 194) .
The key weakness of the model, fully acknowledged by the authors, was that it really only works in a dominant two party system in which it is safe to ignore minor parties. This was certainly true in 1950 when the Conservatives and Labour together took 90 per cent of the vote and 98 per cent of the seats. But as the British party system evolved towards the multi-party system of today the forecasts got progressively less accurate. In the early 1970s
Edward Tufte (1973) suggested that a '2.5 rule' should be used as an alternative and Laakso (1979) showed that this appeared to work quite well at that time. But as we enter a new context of a fragmented multi-party system this is no longer the case.
Accordingly, we make three modifications to the Cube Rule to adapt it for forecasting seats in the 2015 election. The first change is to estimate the exponents rather than assuming that they are 3.0, thereby removing one source of error. Secondly, we utilise seat shares won by each party in the last parliament rather than the seat shares won contemporaneously by the rival party, as in equation (2). This is designed to capture the incumbency effect, which is partly a matter of existing MPs having a personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987) , but also the fact that parties represented at Westminster generally have much better coverage in the media than their non-parliamentary rivals and therefore are much better known to the general public. Incumbency bestows several advantages on the existing parties which need to be taken into account in the modelling.
The third change is that we utilise poll shares six months rather than three days prior to the election in order to make the forecast. The six month lag has been identified as the most efficient compromise between having the longest lead time for the forecast with the highest goodness of fit of the model . It is clearly advantageous to have as long a lead time for the forecast as possible without this degrading its accuracy and the six months lag achieves this goal.
The theoretical forecasting model is given by the following expression:
where S it is the seat share of party i at the election at time t P it-m is the vote share for party i out of k parties, in the polls m months prior to the election α, β j , γ i are parameters to be estimated
The theoretical model includes all rival parties but in practice this cannot be estimated since it would be perfectly collinear, so the empirical model estimates future seats for a party from its past seats and also from poll data for the party and its main rival. shock to the system, and this needs to be taken into account in the modelling (Carnot, Koen and Tissot, 2005) . We return to this issue below.
The empirical models for the two major parties contain a dummy variable designed to capture the split in the Labour party in 1981 when the Social Democratic Party was formed.
This huge shock to the party system arose from Labour's defeat in 1979 and had a very strong impact on the party's poor performance in the subsequent 1983 election. So the M A N U S C R I P T
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7 variable scores one in 1979 and 1983 and zero otherwise, to capture these divisions in the party which occurred after it lost power to Mrs Thatcher in 1979.
( Table 1 about here)
The results of the modelling for the two major parties appear in Table 1 Various diagnostic tests (Table 1) show that the models are free of residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the estimates and the model residuals approximate a Normal distribution, indicating that there are no significant outliers that influence the results (Kennedy, 2013) . The Ramsey test for the adequacy of a linear functional form test is not significant for Labour although it is significant for the Conservatives 2 . Overall, these diagnostic tests indicate that the models are quite well behaved and so are likely to produce reliable results when applied to the task of forecasting seats in May 2015. Box and Jenkins (1970) and it has been used to forecast vote shares in British general elections in the past (Whiteley, 1979) . It is designed to extract the maximum amount of information from the data in order to forecast it efficiently while controlling for the random noise in the series.
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The starting point of the Box-Jenkins modelling strategy is to determine if the series is stationary, that is, if it fluctuates around a constant mean and has a finite variance in the limit. where the 'I' term is 0, indicating that the Liberal Democrat voting intentions do not need to be differenced to obtain mean stationarity before estimating AR or MA terms.
( Table 2 about Table 2 shows two versions of the ARIMA model, the first is a purely autoregressive model and the second an autoregressive-moving average model. The autoregressive coefficients are highly significant in both versions, and the moving average coefficient is significant in the second. The Ljung-Box portmanteau test indicates if there is any systematic information left in the residuals which has not been captured by the model (Ljung and Box, 1978) . These tests are non-significant for both models indicating that the model residuals are suggests that the parliament that elected in 2015 will be even more divided, making it very difficult, perhaps impossible, to form a stable coalition government. It would not be surprising if another general election occurred well before 2020 in these circumstances.
Post-Election Postscript: Learning from Experience
As is well known all the forecasting models got it wrong with the exception of the exit poll conducted on the day of the election. In the case of the Seats-Votes model two factors help to explain the failure of the modelling. One was the effect of the regime shift on the Liberal Democrat seat share, and the second was the inaccuracy of the polls six months out which were used to predict the seats won by Labour and the Conservatives.
Regarding the first factor, in our paper we argued that the Liberal Democrats had experienced a 'regime shift' and therefore modelling their support required a different approach than that used for the Conservatives and Labour. With hindsight it appears that the regime shift was more fundamental than we thought. The paper showed that if Liberal Democrat seats in 2010 had no effect at all on seats in 2015, implying no incumbency effect, then the forecast would give the party 11 seats. In fact it won 8 seats, so on this assumption the forecast was 3 seats out. The Lib Dem regime shift was clearly more profound than we originally envisaged.
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The second factor concerns the fact that the voting intentions data gathered six months prior to the election were inaccurate guides to the vote shares the Conservatives and A final point-when using polling data as input to an election forecasting model, it is important to recognize and respect the reality of sampling error. Sampling error is not merely a 'get out of jail free' card for embarrassed pollsters whose data miss the mark. Rather, it is an intrinsic feature of the survey research enterprise. Acting in conjunction with the sensitivity of a first-past-the-post system to changes in vote shares in situations where there is a sizable number of marginal seats, sampling error entails a continuing possibility of getting an election outcome wrong. With more and better survey data and improved models, we can reduce the probability of incorrect forecasts, but we cannot eliminate it entirely. That said, being right on most occasions is a worthy goal. 
